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SYMPOSIUM ADDRESS
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND OTHER
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
PRIVATE MILITIA"
The Honorable Edward R. Becker-
It is a great pleasure to be with you in Missoula and to par-
ticipate in the James R. Browning Symposium, named in honor
of a distinguished Montana judge who is also, I am pleased to
say, my good friend. Though I come from almost a continent
away, my roots lie in the same spirit of dialogue and inquiry that
is reflected by this program. I will address the subject of the
Second Amendment and other federal constitutional rights of the
private, or citizen militia.
I note at the outset that my views are not informed by past
experience with private militias. My court, which hears appeals
from federal trial courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware,
and the United States Virgin Islands, has never had a case in-
volving citizen militias, though there are some citizen militias in
Pennsylvania and we may soon get one. Not only do I not belong
to a militia, but I do not own a firearm and have not handled
one since I was a teenager at a summer camp. In addition, I live
in one of America's large eastern cities where a gun is viewed
not as a vehicle for self-protection or a symbol of personal free-
dom, but rather as an object of sheer terror.
The putative rights of gun owners and militia members are
understandably a matter of widespread personal disagreement
* This piece was delivered as a speech at the 1996 James R. Browning
Symposium held on October 4-5, 1996 at the University of Montana School of Law.
It has been slightly modified for purposes of publication.
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1982-date;
B.AK, University of Pennsylvania, 1954 LL.B., Yale Law School, 1957; Judge, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1970-82.
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among Americans of intelligence and good will. That fact alone
counsels that we approach the subject with great circumspection.
However, there are far greater reasons for caution.
What struck me as I reviewed the case law and the litera-
ture on militias, and considered the multifaceted aspects and
ramifications of the subject, is how enormously complex this area
of the law can be. Indeed, I do not recall having encountered a
subject whose legal history is so venerable, rich, and interesting,
and yet whose crosscurrents are so sharp. There are, in fact, few
areas of American constitutional law that are so obscure and
little understood and on which the United States Supreme Court
has given so little guidance. As Professor Van Alstyne observed,
"the useful case law of the Second Amendment... is mostly just
missing in action."'
Holmes said that a page of history is worth a volume of
logic, and so I will begin with some history, albeit, given our
time constraints, a capsule (or whirlwind) history. Before launch-
ing into this history, I should note that a citizen militia is also,
in the philosophical literature, an ancient political ideal. It is
what is known in political theory as a renaissance republican
ideal, i.e., an appropriate way of defending a free republic, the
most prominent and effective exponent of which, you may be
surprised to learn, was Machiavelli. I will speak a good deal
about this important aspect of the matter later, but let me re-
turn to history, as opposed to theory.
That history lies primarily in England, where the roots of
the citizen militia are so ancient that they go back to seventh
century England. At the very least, the citizen militia, as an
institution with a legal identity of its own, existed for several
centuries prior to the Norman Conquest.
The militia's history traverses the centuries of Saxon and
Norman rule into the Middle Ages and thence into the region of
the Tudor monarchs and beyond. The militia reflected a wide
variety of arrangements, but it was largely used in the service of
the monarch, for whom it usually played the role of a standby
professional army. Under the Tudor monarchs, the militia
reached its prime. It was well-organized and required drills, in-
spections, and target practice. Moreover, throughout a period of
several centuries, citizens were encouraged to own and be profi-
cient in the use of arms, so that there was a tradition of univer-
1. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 (1994).
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sal participation in the defense of the monarchy. The 1285 stat-
ute of Winchester, for example, required anyone who could afford
them to keep bows and arrows. Not until the sixteenth century
was the policy to restrict weapon ownership to the wealthier
classes.
There were, of course, times when the local militia was inde-
pendent of, and exercised a moderating influence on, monarchi-
cal rule, such as in the famous Wat Taylor revolt of 1381. The
very presence of the militia was a moderating influence on the
monarchy, particularly as Parliament began to develop its influ-
ence and powers.
The decline of the militia was a long time in coming, but it
began in force toward the end of the seventeenth century due to
two factors: the ascendancy of Parliament, which was interested
in checking monarchical power; and the acceptance of a standing
army, which had become a necessity to the conduct of warfare.
Doctrinally, there was also a complementary and related devel-
opment-the emergence of a "justice theory" of individual rights
informed by certain amendments initiated in the House of Lords,
which included the notion of an individual's right to arms, sepa-
rate and apart from the militia. Despite these countervailing
strains, the dominant theme throughout most of the history of
the militia in England was the notion that it was an appropriate
way of defending the state.
In isolated colonial America, however, conditions were differ-
ent. The colonies lacked the need for a military force for external
engagements, and their economy could not support a standing
army. The militia was received in colonies with enthusiasm, and
it soon came to play a role not only as a means for colonial gov-
ernments to enforce their decisions, but as a popular check on
the excesses of royal authority, first in Virginia in Bacon's Rebel-
lion in the seventeenth century and later just prior to the Ameri-
can Revolution. Patrick Henry's "give me liberty" speech was an
adjunct to his resolution in favor of a well-regulated militia. The
minutemen of Massachusetts were, of course, a militia.
The militia was viewed by George Mason and others, at
least in theory, as comprising the whole people of the United
States, or at least all males of arms-bearing age. At the same
time there developed a strong colonial resentment to a standing
army, which was conceived of as dangerous to liberty. So said
the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776, and so suggested
the proposals for the Virginia Constitution. Madison's draft rec-
ognized a well-regulated militia as the proper natural defense of
1997]
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a free state. In contrast, Jefferson's Virginia draft contained no
mention of a militia, but instead included an individual right to
arms (albeit only for "freemen") out of concern that over-regula-
tion of the militia by the state might endanger individual liber-
ties. To Montesquieu and Jefferson, both advocates of the en-
lightenment theory of political democracy, the right to bear arms
was a symbol of freedom.
Madison's proposal was adopted in Virginia. Pennsylvania
followed Jefferson, and the other states were philosophically
divided. After the revolution, however, the need for national
security and the poor performance of the militias during the war
led to increased support for a standing army. The debate contin-
ued through the Constitutional Convention with the Federalists
and Anti-Federalists taking the expected sides. The Federalists
responded to Anti-Federalist arguments against granting Con-
gress broad powers to create a federal standing army by claiming
that the militias could counter the influence of the army. Some
Anti-Federalists, however, even feared that the federal govern-
ment would disarm the militias.
Then came the dialogue between these two factions over the
need for a Bill of Rights, and ultimately the Bill of Rights itself.
What ultimately emerged was a (typically American) compro-
mise, which included both a provision for a right to bear arms
and for a militia.
For our purposes today, the key point is that, notwithstand-
ing the Jeffersonian theory about the right to bear arms, all
militia proposals during the history of the colonies and the early
Republic were linked to the notion that the militia was the best
security for a free state. The Second Amendment was in accord.
Its text reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."2
So then, rather than enhancing the case for the protection of
private militias, the Second Amendment was drafted to provide
for a militia that could protect the new state. My point is under-
scored by the fact that, when reviewing the history of the Ameri-
can militias during the first two decades of the Republic, what is
most dramatic is that the ancient concept of the militia, and any
semblance of the notion that it would be an instrument of revolu-
tionary republicanism, quickly disappeared. The needs of the
new nation foreclosed it. Requests for legislation to organize
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
[Vol. 58
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citizen militias declined, while efforts to build a standing army
increased. The language Madison chose was sufficient to satisfy
both the supporters of the well-regulated militia ideal and the
advocates of the Jeffersonian enlightenment theory. Concomi-
tantly, it also was sufficiently flexible to permit the nation to
meet its changing military needs.
While the military activity of the citizen-soldier, as a militia
member is sometimes called, is part-time today just as it was in
the time of the minutemen of Lexington and Concord, the nature
of the state militia is different. It is only a fraction of the popu-
lation, and a highly structured one at that-typically a state
national guard unit. Moreover, the history of federal legislation
pertaining to militias, which, after the Dick Act of 1903 became
known collectively as the National Guard, is one of increasing
federal control, funding, and training with requirements for
periodic service. Nothing controversial there. So isn't it odd that
suddenly, in the late 1990s, a time fairly said to be eons and
light years (in terms of technology and social development) from
the time I have described when a citizen's militia played a sig-
nificant societal role, we suddenly are called upon to interpret
this virtually forgotten clause in the constitution because of the
rise of private (as opposed to state) militias? I note in this regard
that the first extensive examination of the militia clauses was
not undertaken until 1940.'
Turning to the jurisprudence in this area, there is but one
case of real importance: United States v. Miller,4 which the Su-
preme Court decided in 1939. Miller was charged with transport-
ing in interstate commerce a shotgun having a barrel less than
eighteen inches long without having registered it as was re-
quired by the National Firearms Act of 1934. The Court rejected
the argument that the Act violated the Second Amendment,
noting that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to make
possible the continuation of the militias that were authorized by
Article I, Section 8, paragraph 16, in order to serve the state.
The Court noted that in most states the members of the militia
were expected to supply for themselves arms of the kind in com-
mon use at the time. The Court held that the Second Amendment
protects the right to bear only those arms that bear a "reason-
able relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
3. Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARv.
L. REV. 181 (1940).
4. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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lated militia"5 and that a shotgun did not fit that description.
Fairly read, Miller cannot mean that only ancient weapons
are protected, or that all weapons useful to a militia would be
protected. But whatever else it means, Miller does make clear
that what the Second Amendment protects is state militias.
Although the meaning of the term "well regulated," as it relates
to militia, has not been judicially fleshed out, the Court's use of
this term surely implies that militias are to be governed by state
governments alone and that they are not private, unorganized
groups. Put differently, "militia" does not mean just any group
that chooses to call itself a militia. Conversely, it seems clear
that private militias are not "well regulated," and that the Sec-
ond Amendment's general protection of the right to possess arms
extends only to weapons that bear a reasonable relation to carry-
ing out the responsibilities of the state-regulated militias.
In the only case that I know of in which it was argued that
the Second Amendment protected private militias, Vietnamese
Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,' the court
relied on Miller and soundly rejected its contention. More specifi-
cally, the court rejected the defendants' claim that their Second
Amendment rights had been violated by a Texas law prohibiting
private militias, explaining that the Second Amendment prohib-
its only interference with the bearing of weapons that would
affect the state-organized militia. The court stated: "By its ex-
press language, that Amendment prohibits only such infringe-
ment on the bearing of weapons as would interfere with 'the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,' organized
by the State."7 It also concluded that "the Second Amendment
does not imply any general constitutional right for individuals to
bear arms and form private armies." '
There is, I should also note, more general jurisprudence in
support of that proposition, including that in Montana's own
Ninth Circuit. In Hickman v. Block,9 the court held that "the
Second Amendment is a right held by the states and does not
protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen."10
Now I must concede that the doctrinal history of the militia,
5. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
6. 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
7. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n, 543 F. Supp. at 210 (quoting United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
8. Id.
9. 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. Hickman, 81 F.3d at 101.
(Vol. 58
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which can be traced to renaissance notions of the elitist republi-
can state, contains theoretical support for protection of private
militias. In republican thinking, the militia was a creature of the
state apparatus; the state had organized it, trained it, and mobi-
lized it against foreign invasion or domestic insurrection. On the
other hand, it was composed of all of the citizens, deriving its
legitimacy from them and being virtually synonymous with
them.
Under this taxonomy, the militia was a forum in which state
and society were intertwined, a combination that offered some
advantages for ensuring the survival of a republican state. The
militia, constituted as an instrument of the state, could restrain
any movement toward domestic insurrection. But if the state
became despotic, then the militia, now constituted as "the peo-
ple," could resist it. Indeed, in theory, the line between state and
people disappeared in the militia, in that the militia members
were both rulers and ruled.
Through the militia ideal, republicanism offers practical
guidance on how to ensure civic virtue in the form of disinterest-
ed self-sacrifice amongst a nonvirtuous, self-interested populace.
Although this militia ideal seems totally utopian in its notion
that politics may be redemptive, that ideal is the exemplar of the
main theme of republicanism-empowering citizens to pursue
the common good.
So much for theory. Turning to my ultimate theme, the fact
is that, in light of the history I have described, the notion that
private militias, such as the ones that you know so much about
here in Montana, and the ones that the nation learned about in
the wake of Ruby Ridge and the Oklahoma City tragedy, are pro-
tected by the Second Amendment is quite farfetched. There are a
few strains in the history of militias that suggest that militias
are necessary to stifle an oppressive sovereign. I have mentioned
the Wat Tyler Revolt, and could add the Shays' and Whiskey
Rebellions, though such characterizations of those rebellions may
be open to question. They are, however, only a few snippets. The
essential function of the militia through English and American
history was to serve the state while permitting private citizens to
participate in government. Hence, no fair or serious appraisal of
the history of the militia can lead to the conclusion that private
militias are protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, I submit that the notion that in this age of powerful
plastic explosives and small tactical nuclear weapons, where the
threat of terrorism strikes fear into the heart of everyone who
1997]
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occupies a federal building or flies in an airplane, the Second
Amendment protects private militias, many of whose members
are bitter, violent extremists, haters of government, and minori-
ties, is not only contrary to history but also quite frightening.
Small wonder that one of the leading scholarly pieces on the
militia, which acknowledges the theoretical history I just de-
scribed, is entitled "Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia:
The Terrifying Second Amendment."1
At bottom, the arguments undergirding the claim of Second
Amendment protection for the private militia make no sense
today. The notion that the militia must be a counterweight to a
standing army in the age of missiles and satellites is fantastic.
Technological progress will only accelerate, so that that situation
will never change. Moreover, the notion that a citizen militia is a
necessary vehicle for citizen participation in government rings
hollow in an age of broadly participatory democracy. Whatever
one's approach to statutory construction, the history of the mili-
tia and of the drafting of the Second Amendment make clear
that the interpretation I have advanced, that private militias
possess no Second Amendment protection, is the sounder one. In
my view, not even the originalists can seriously argue otherwise.
Now I stated at the outset that the subject was extraordi-
narily complicated, yet I have made it seem quite simple. Howev-
er, the subject is complicated because just as the whole may be
said to be equal the sum of its parts, the rights of the militia are
advanced not just in the corporate sense, but also in the individ-
ual sense in terms of the personal rights of individual militia
members to bear arms. And there's the rub, because these con-
siderations take us well beyond the history and meaning of the
Second Amendment into the domain of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The First Amendment is implicated because individual mili-
tia members advance both free speech and associational rights in
connection with their common cause. A specific application arises
in the context of the numerous state statutes proscribing para-
military training by private militias. Most private militias are
political factions comprised of individuals bound together by
their distrust of government and their desires first, to associate
and second, to discuss and improve government by speaking out.
The First Amendment is clearly implicated here. Of course there
11. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Ter-
rifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
[Vol. 58
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is a difference between speech and association on the one hand,
and conduct such as paramilitary training on the other, but
ofttimes in the law distinctions get blurred.
The recent burgeoning of federal gun control legislation has
highlighted the potential role of the Second Amendment with
respect to the individual right, as opposed to the right of militias,
to bear arms. The recent cases involve Second Amendment chal-
lenges to legislative bans on certain weapons (such as semiauto-
matic assault weapons), license requirements, aspects of felon in
possession laws, and waiting requirements such as in the Brady
Act. While the Supreme Court has never drawn clear lines in
this area, the emerging case law, which there is not time for me
to survey, makes clear that the right of individuals to bear arms
under the Second Amendment is not obsolete. Indeed, some ad-
vocates of gun control have argued that it may be necessary to
repeal the Second Amendment to effect their aims.
The engagement of the Fourteenth Amendment here is fasci-
nating, and it is implicated because of its singular history. It is
clear that a number of the prominent proponents of the amend-
ment explicitly demanded that states not be allowed to infringe
the individual rights of all citizens to bear arms. Some of these
men were not only Jeffersonian democrats, but abolitionists, who
believed that the rebellious states had violated the Second
Amendment by denying blacks the right to bear arms.
Indeed, two prominent figures in framing the Fourteenth
Amendment, its drafter, Senator Bingham, and its presenter on
behalf of the joint committee formed to decide whether the
southern states should be readmitted to the Union, Senator
Howard, believed that the Amendment would prevent state gov-
ernments from infringing the right to bear arms. It is significant
that Senator Howard believed that the right to keep and bear
arms must be included in the "privileges and immunities" of citi-
zens. In fact, Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision recognized
this possibility by arguing that one reason that freed blacks
could not become citizens of the United States was that, if they
were, they would be able to keep and carry arms wherever they
went.
While the Fourteenth Amendment debates are interesting,
their significance to the right to bear arms is far from clear. The
statements made by the Republican supporters of the
Amendment arguably lend considerable credence to the argu-
ments of opponents of federal gun control measures who claim
that the Second Amendment has a strong individual rights com-
19971
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ponent. On the other hand, the Reconstruction period debates
have had little effect on the state of the law today. The Second
Amendment has never been incorporated against the states by
the Supreme Court, and the Slaughterhouse Cases eviscerated
any argument under the privileges and immunities clause that
states cannot restrict the individuals right to bear arms. Howev-
er, like the other issues I have discussed, this issue is far from
an "open and shut" case. Some scholars, noting the interesting
debates in the Reconstruction Congress, have suggested that the
Second Amendment should be incorporated against the states.
For example, Professor Akhil Amar, in his argument for "refined
incorporation," has suggested that the Second Amendment
should be incorporated to the extent that the Amendment guar-
antees a privilege or immunity of individual citizens rather than
a right of the state or the public at large.12
Neither the viability of putative Second Amendment
protections in the context of gun control laws, whether stemming
from the Fourteenth Amendment, from the Second Amendment
itself, or from speech or associational rights conferred by the
First Amendment, justify the position that the activities of the
militia qua militia are entitled to federal constitutional protec-
tion. On the other hand, we must be cautious and acknowledge
that our system of government is far from perfect: that it is sus-
ceptible to excess from time to time, particularly in response to
media-fanned political passion, and that we cannot foresee the
shape of our government in relation to society (and the individu-
al) 100 or 200 years from now.
In the face of that acknowledgment, the argument for Sec-
ond Amendment protection of private militias derived from the
republican (or neo-republican) ideal, cannot be regarded as quix-
otic. Indeed, the republican notion that the means of force could
be vested in those who would express universal good, so as to
resist tyranny, is an appealing ideal, and so the theoretical argu-
ment is also not without emotional appeal.
However, the republican ideal is a construct only. It has
never really existed in the 1,200 year history of the militia.
There is at least no modern analogue for the universal militia,
neither gun owners who have broadly disparate interests, nor
the National Guard. It is nigh impossible to identify a common
interest among a heterogenous citizenry. The right to arms may
12. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
[Vol. 58
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be a reflection of the deep commitment to republican politics in a
liberal state, but if those politics are an ideal, they are under-
mined by the complexities of the distribution of power among
government and infinitely conflicting private interests. Holmes
also taught us that experience, not logic, is the life of the law. So
then, history trumps.
Theory, however, always injects a note of caution. Thus, the
lesson of all this is, I submit, that we judges (and you lawyers)
must be very cautious in dealing with Second Amendment is-
sues, and careful how we write when dealing with militia-related
Second Amendment claims. I have argued, I hope convincingly,
that there is no constitutional right protecting the activities of
the militia qua militia. I also believe that paramilitary training
is not protected by the Second Amendment right to a well-regu-
lated militia: the state has not conferred this status on paramili-
tary groups, and their possession of arms is, therefore, not rea-
sonably related to the maintenance of a well-regulated militia.
In litigating and deciding such matters we must apply the
narrowest construction so as to avoid a constitutional thicket.
The legal landscape in this area is like an underground network
of utility services in a large city; the conduits for the First, Sec-
ond, and Fourteenth Amendments all interface, and we must
operate with a scalpel, not a backhoe. For example, anti-paramil-
itary organization laws (in contrast to anti-paramilitary training
laws) may not violate Second Amendment rights, but they may
violate First Amendment rights to speech and association, and
one issue often segues into another. If we write carelessly, we
may use a cannon to kill small game, and damage the fabric of
the Constitution in the process, thereby tying our hands in deal-
ing with unforeseen future cases. Drawing careful lines is, of
course, something that lawyers and especially judges are used to
doing. We should remember it here.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you in Montana
and to participate in this important program.
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